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1 Introduction
This paper brings together economic theory and innovative methodology in
order to focus on some key questions that lie at the heart of the theory
of choice under uncertainty. We investigate the structure of individuals’
rankings of uncertain prospects in terms of risk and their relationship to
individual preferences. Specifically, we examine three interlinked propositions
that are fundamental to the standard economic approach to risk:
1. that rankings by risk are simply the reverse of ranking by preference
over distributions with a given mean;
2. that risk-rankings respect the principle of mean-preserving spreads;
3. that risk-rankings are independent of whether the individual is person-
ally involved in the gains/losses associated with the uncertain prospects.
To address these issues we use questionnaire-experiments, building on
previous studies on perceptions of inequality, risk and welfare. While the
use of experiments in economics has progressed rapidly in recent decades,
mainly in the study of markets and individual interactions, similar work
on normative economics and the study of preferences is still comparatively
rare. The literature described in Amiel and Cowell (1999) developed an
original experimental setting for studying the empirical validity of inequality
measurement axioms. We extend this technique in a number of ways.
The basic intuition is that the agents’ personal judgements may not be
captured adequately by conventional theory. The benchmarks against which
the axioms are compared are the perceptions and judgements from responses
to carefully specified questionnaire experiments. The use of such experimen-
tal techniques is a valuable tool for investigating the structure of individual’s
judgments about distributions of outcomes in terms of welfare, risk and un-
certainty. While previous studies focused mainly upon whether responses
conform to standard axioms of inequality analysis, it is our aim to extend
the approach to cover the main assumptions of risk theory.
The results from the questionnaires provide an evaluation of the diﬀer-
ences and similarities between individual perceptions of risk and theoretical
axioms with respect to the three questions we outlined above. The exper-
imental results also help identify specific response patterns and systematic
diﬀerences in the determinants of attitudes toward risk in terms of observable
characteristics of the respondents. This will assist in developing an approach
to risk in economics that is based on evidence rather than assumptions of
mathematical convenience.
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We implement our questionnaire experiments through the Virtual Labo-
ratory, a novel web-based experimental tool for the study of normative issues
and preferences in economics. The use of the Virtual Laboratory represents
an important methodological development in the field, providing researchers
with a new facility that supersedes the paper questionnaires on which previ-
ous research was based.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 starts with a brief discus-
sion of the theoretical background in terms of basic principles and previous
research on the issue. Section 3 contains a description of our experimental
setup, reviews the content of the experiment, and illustrates the advantages
of the novel experimental methodology employed here. Finally, in Section 4
we present some results from the questionnaires we administered to a set of
students. Conclusions follow.
2 Theory and background
In recent years experimental methods in economics have been extended to the
analysis of income distributions (Amiel and Cowell 1999). One of the main
purposes of this literature is to establish whether conventional approaches
to modelling inequality, welfare and related concepts are consistent with the
way individuals view income distributions. Since both the theoretical and
empirical settings of this paper originate in this literature, we will briefly
summarize its development in order to set the context for our research after
an introduction to our main research question.
2.1 The meaning of risk
In the abstract, the concept of risk is remarkably diﬃcult to pin down. Stan-
dard reference works fall back on either generalised descriptions or a simple
enumeration of alternative interpretations.1 In short: “people disagree more
about what risk is than about how large it is” (Fischhoﬀ 1985).
In the economics literature one might immediately think of a standard
paradigm derived from the conventional model of choice under uncertainty
— the expected utility (EU) model. However, despite the ubiquity of the
1For example Pass et al. (1993) states that “risk reflects the variability of future returns
from a capital investment”. Yates (1992) lists ten diﬀerent definitions of risk on page 1.
“Risk should not, however, be confused with probability since it is an amalgam of both
this probability and the size of the event. If the 1 in 10 chance of a loss is one of making
a very big loss indeed, this can be a more risky event than one where the probable gains
are exactly the same, but the risk of loss is much smaller.” (Pearce 1983 page 287).
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paradigm, there are good reasons to query it as the sole basis for the analysis
of risk.
First, it is generally acknowledged that the EU model is somewhat re-
strictive: it imposes an additively separable structure on the utility function
that implies strong assumptions about the way individuals perceive choices
among alternative prospects. For this reason a number of alternative models
— such as rank-dependent expected utility, for instance — have been consid-
ered as alternative models of individual preference under uncertainty with
consequences for the formulation of risk.2 Because the notion of risk itself
is the product of a specific axiomatisation, in that the axioms relate to the
preference structure from which the risk concept is extracted, risk-rankings
derived from EU are special. It is clear that even if peoples’ preferences do
not conform to EU assumptions, they may yet have a coherent perception of
risk.
Second, risk can be axiomatised directly, not as a derivation from a model
of preference. This is arguably more general than a preference-based ap-
proach in that assessments in terms of risk may be considered to have appli-
cations over a broad range of distributional comparisons, and not just over
situations in which an individual has a personal stake. This direct approach
can be illuminated by considering risk in the context of a parallel literature.
2.2 Risk and inequality
There is a historic link between the analysis of economic inequality and that
of risk and this link is informative in understanding the issues that are central
to this paper.
Some of the early inequality literature uses the well-developed theory of
choice under uncertainty and its associated model of risk and transposes the
main concepts from one kind of distribution (probability) to another (in-
come or wealth): inequality is just risk in new clothes (Atkinson 1970). The
inequality-risk link has been made more formal through explicit axiomatisa-
tion, mainly but not only by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970, 1971, 1973). In
addition there is an approach that suggests that social choice among income
distributions should be based on a choice amongst lotteries behind a “veil
of ignorance” as to one’s identity (Harsanyi 1953, 1955) — social aversion to
inequality is then explicitly based on personal aversion to risk.
The close relationship between the two fields suggests that some of the
research methods that have been applied to investigate further the axiomatic
2Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Kahneman et al. (1982) are perhaps the most fa-
mous, but certainly not the only theoretical developments of non expected utility theories.
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basis for inequality analysis may also be applicable to risk (Amiel and Cowell
1999). However, the social-welfare theoretic approach to income distribution
can further assist in understanding points that we want to investigate in the
context of risk. This approach can be briefly summarised as follows.
Suppose F represents the set of all income distributions — each member
of the set is a univariate distribution function3 F . The problem is to rank F
according to criteria that suitably reflect social values: this is done either by
using social-welfare functions or inequality measures, and by specifying the
characteristics of a class of these functions that make clear what is meant by
“suitable.” It is conventional to assume:
• A social-welfare function W is endowed with “ethical” properties such
as monotonicity and Schur-concavity; perhaps also with “structural”
properties such as homotheticity and decomposability.
• Likewise the inequality measure I satisfies the Principle of Transfers (it
is Schur-convex) and may be endowed with structure properties that
complement those of W .
• For each F in a subset of F with given mean µ there is a link between
the two concepts, welfare and inequality
I(F ) = φ (W (F ), µ) (1)
where φ is strictly decreasing in its first argument.
• The selection of a particular W or I does not depend on an observer’s
own position in the income distribution. This is implied by, for exam-
ple, the “veil of ignorance” assumption of Harsanyi.
Clearly, either W or I could be taken as the basic concept and the re-
lationship (1) establishes an equivalence between the class of social-welfare
functions and the class of inequality measures.
Now the approach to risk could be characterised in similar terms: F would
represent the set of all probability distributions relating to some random en-
dowment of income and the problem would be to rank F according to criteria
that “suitably” reflect individual preferences in the face of uncertainty. This
would be done by specifying a class of utility functions or a class of risk
measures. In the risk literature the following is usually assumed, explicitly
or implicitly:
3The support of F is usually taken to be the set of all nonnegative numbers. For any
income x ≥ 0, F (x) represents the proportion of the population less than or equal to x.
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• A suitable utility function U is endowed with standard properties such
as monotonicity and quasi-concavity. For a conventional EU approach
separability and other structural properties are also required. For some
applications further structural properties such as constant absolute risk
aversion or constant relative risk aversion may also be imposed.
• Likewise the risk measure R satisfies the principle of mean-preserving
spreads (MPS) — the counterpart of quasi-concavity for U (Rothschild
and Stiglitz 1970).
• For each F in a subset of F with given mean µ there is a link between
the two concepts, utility and risk
R(F ) = φ (U(F ), µ) (2)
where φ is strictly decreasing in its first argument. Once again φ es-
tablishes an equivalence relation between the class of utility functions
and the class of risk measures.
• The selection of a particular R does not depend on an observer’s own
involvement in the risk.
Each of the points in this list is open to challenge. For example, in the
context of the preference-related approach to risk, it is not self-evident that
individuals’ preferences conform to the EU paradigm;4 if one examines atti-
tudes to risk — either directly or inferred from preferences — these may violate
the MPS principle in some parts of the distribution. Rankings according to
U may diﬀer from R-rankings because of a confusion between “better-than”
relationships and pure risk comparisons. Moreover, it is possible that indi-
viduals’ preference orderings over risky choices that directly aﬀect their own
personal wellbeing may diﬀer from risk orderings that are applicable to im-
personal comparisons, or comparisons involving others (with varying degrees
of proximity).
2.3 The approach
A comprehensive study that successfully disentangled the concept of risk per
se from the language of preference would require the investigation of several
key axioms twice over — for the functions U and R defined above. This
4For a review of experimental evidence on the EU model and other paradigms of indi-
vidual decision making see Camerer (1995).
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would clearly be demanding. We have a more narrowly-focused agenda that
concentrates on some of the key assumptions about risk highlighted in Section
2.2. Specifically, we want to investigate:
1. whether rankings by risk are simply the reverse of ranking by preference
over distributions with a given mean;
2. whether risk-rankings respect the MPS principle
3. that risk-rankings are independent of whether the individual is person-
ally involved in the gains/losses associated with the uncertain prospects.
We will pursue this using a methodology that has been established in the
context of inequality and social welfare.
3 Experimental Setting
3.1 Methodology — previous experiments
The collection of evidence on the validity of axioms is a central task in the
literature on inequality perceptions (Amiel and Cowell 1999), and is also
central for answering our previous questions on risk theory. The benchmarks
against which the axioms are compared are the perceptions and judgements
from ordinary individuals. While stressing the obvious point that the axioms
cannot be right or wrong, it is still interesting to know the extent to which
the principles used by social scientists are relevant or coincide with the values
of individuals.
How is this to be done? Eliciting such preferences or attitudes from
economic data is not an easy task, as some of the studies trying to obtain
“revealed preferences” from economic aggregates have found. The solution
may lie in the field of experimental economics.
The use of experiments in economics has progressed rapidly from rel-
ative obscurity to Nobel prize-winning prominence; they are now seen to
provide an important source of empirical information as an alternative to
market observations, and experiments are now well established in a number
of economic applications. They are used, for instance, to analyse behavioural
choices where an econometric approach to market outcomes is inappropri-
ate because of lack of data, measurement diﬃculties or thinness of samples.
However, standard experimental approaches concentrate on participatory ex-
periments designed to investigate the way people behave, for instance, in
laboratory markets, or in interactions in provision-of-public-goods types of
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settings. Although there is a large literature on experimental bargaining and
the problem of experimental design in such contexts, similar work on norma-
tive economics and the analysis of preferences is still rare. Our aim, as in the
inequality perceptions literature, is not to analyse actual behaviour, but to
unearth the basic implicit principles that guide individual judgements. With
these objectives in mind, traditional experimental settings are unlikely to be
useful.
The research programme described in Amiel and Cowell (1999) has de-
veloped an original experimental setting to study inequality perceptions and
related concepts. Amiel and Cowell (1999), Gaertner and Jungeilges (1999)
and Schokkaert and Devooght (1998) are examples of these experimental
techniques applied to normative issues. The original approach consists in
using questionnaire-experiments to establish the type of assumptions about
inequality comparisons implicitly made by the experimental subjects in their
choices.
The original experiments on inequality perceptions, whether paper or
computer based, shared a set of similar characteristics. Since the aim was
the comparison of distributions, the respondents faced a series of pairs of
vectors, and were asked to compare them. Typically, respondents were con-
fronted with two sets of distributions, and asked to rank them according to
some criteria (more/less unequal, better/worse...). The following section, the
“verbal” question, consisted of a long question that enunciated the principle
on which the questionnaire was focusing, and provided diﬀerent versions of
the theoretical principles underlying the choices between distributions. Re-
spondents had to choose which option (if any) they agreed with. All this
was done with a fictional underlying story (for instance, policy options in
some non existent country), and the fact that there were no correct answers
was stressed to encourage pure statement of preferences. Section 3.2 and the
Appendix contain a detailed description of our specific setting.
An important feature of these experiments was that there was not one
but at least two versions of each, with the same income distributions and the
same type of verbal question; the diﬀerence was that while half of the copies
were asking questions in terms of what was “more unequal”, the other half
would be termed, for instance, “riskier” (for inequality-risk experiments)
or “better” (for preference-inequality experiments). See Amiel and Cowell
(1999, 2002) for a complete set of questionnaires and a lengthy discussion of
their administration.
The questionnaire approach has provided important insights on the issues
discussed above, namely, (a) whether or not standard assumptions made in
the formulation of distributional orderings are appropriate, and (b) the fac-
tors accounting for systematic diﬀerences between certain groups of persons
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in their attitudes on issues such as inequality, poverty and social welfare. We
aim to establish whether these insights also apply to the theory of risk.
Results from previous studies have found rejections of some of the basic
inequality axioms, which sometimes respond to specific patterns. For in-
stance, Amiel and Cowell 1999 find that while studying economics and being
male increases the likelihood of responses being consistent with economic or-
thodoxy, other background variables such as income, political attitudes and
age are relatively unimportant.
In the light of these results, obtained with experiments exploiting the
analogies between risk and inequality, our research question becomes all the
more relevant. Using the methodology developed for the inequality field, we
will focus on the question — what is the meaning of risk comparisons?
3.2 The experimental setting
As discussed above, a specific model of preference — expected utility — is
usually taken as the vehicle for the microeconomics of choice in the face of
uncertainty. However, there are alternative possibilities — potentially “appro-
priate” axiom structures — for representing risk comparisons. Our experiment
aims to distinguish fundamentally diﬀerent patterns of risk comparisons.
Our setting for the study of risk draws from these original designs, but
also contains a series of innovations. While the underlying vectors and ques-
tions are similar, our research implied a higher level of involvement from the
individual respondents. In previous experiments, the judgements about the
whole society required some form of “Olympian detachment”, but in terms of
risk, the individual’s perceptions required him or her to be involved. Given
that our respondents were students, we decided to ask our questions in terms
of potential jobs. The vectors of incomes would not represent the distribution
of income in a society, but the earning possibilities of two diﬀerent jobs.
However, how close should the individual be? Should the hypothetical
situation refer to him/herself, or to someone close? To analyse the eﬀect
of the level of involvement, we study the issue of whether individuals would
recommend the same prospects for themselves or for a friend.5
The experiment, then, follows the structure of previous studies (Section
3.1), consisting of six numerical questions and one verbal question. Our
experiment is an extension of the original setting by Amiel and Cowell (2002),
focusing on the three specific issues highlighted in Section 2.3.
Regarding the specific issue of whether risk-rankings respect the MPS
principle, we adopted for the numerical questions the same income vectors as
5We owe this variation of the experiment to a suggestion by Yoram Amiel.
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Amiel and Cowell (2002).6 For each pair of vectors, the first can be obtained
from the second by a mean preserving spread, and thus the agreement of the
respondent with the MPS principle can be easily deduced.
Dealing with the other two points raised (whether rankings by risk are
simply the reverse of ranking by preference over distributions with a given
mean, and whether risk-rankings are independent of personal involvement
by the individual), however, is not self-evident. Ideally, one would like to
ask to the same person similar questions in terms of riskiness and preference,
and with and without involvement, to test whether any of these two issues
make a diﬀerence with respect to the nature of risk perceptions and judge-
ments. Clearly, it is not possible to do this, since asking the same or very
similar questions would bias the respondent’s answers. We thus adopted the
randomisation procedure described in the previous section and in Amiel and
Cowell (2002). While we cannot ask similar questions to the same respon-
dent, we can still assign diﬀerent types of questionnaires at random. With a
suﬃciently large and carefully selected sample, we can test whether diﬀerent
questionnaire formats matter for answers to questions with the same under-
lying structure. We are thus able to examine the structure of both types of
comparison (risk/preference rankings, and personal involvement) simultane-
ously with the procedure outlined below.
We use four similarly structured versions of the questionnaire. There is
a randomisation between the risk and preference types of questionnaire, and
also with respect to the way in which the questions are phrased: respondents
are asked to choose a job for themselves, or alternatively which option they
would recommend to a friend. This results in four types of questionnaires,
with categories defined as follows:
• Friend/Self : the questionnaires ask about a prospective job oﬀer to be
considered by the respondent (self ), or for advising a friend (friend).
• Risk /Preference: in the numerical questions, the options are labeled
“More risky” (risk) or “Better” (preference).
The Appendix contains a template of the full questionnaire, with the
content of the verbal question as well.7 We reproduce here the first numerical
question and its introductory blurb in the four formats:
6The diﬀerences in the fictional prospective incomes are relatively large. While this may
be considered unrealistic, we believe there is an implicit contract between the researcher
and the experimental subject about the fictional nature of the setting.
7The four versions are also available online: http://darp.lse.ac.uk/types.htm
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Risk-Self: “Below are two alternative lists of incomes A and
B (in the same currency). Each list represents the five possible
outcomes of the A-job or the B-job respectively after you have
accepted it. Please state which you consider would result in higher
risk for yourself by clicking the appropriate button.”
Preference-Self:“Below are two alternative lists of incomes A
and B (in the same currency). Each list represents the five possi-
ble outcomes of the A-job or the B-job respectively after you have
accepted it. Please state which you consider would be better for
yourself by clicking the appropriate button.”
Risk-Friend: “Below are two alternative lists of incomes A and
B (in the same currency). Each list represents the five possible
outcomes of the A-job or the B-job respectively after your friend
has accepted it. Please state which you consider would result in
higher risk for your friend by clicking the appropriate button.”
Preference-Friend: “Below are two alternative lists of incomes
A and B (in the same currency). Each list represents the five
possible outcomes of the A-job or the B-job respectively after your
friend has accepted it. Please state which you consider would be
better for your friend by clicking the appropriate button.”
A (2, 5, 9, 20, 30)
B (2, 6, 8, 20, 30)
• A more risky / A better
• B more risky / B better
Apart from the diﬀering introductions from the numerical questions and
corresponding diﬀerences in wording of the verbal question, all the ques-
tionnaires are exactly the same. The experiments are implemented on the
Internet (see Section 3.3 below). After logging on to the questionnaire site,
the respondent is presented with a general preamble, followed by an expla-
nation about the format of the numerical questions. The preamble stresses
the fact that there are no right or wrong answers, and that the researchers
are interested solely in the respondent’s judgements and preferences. The
six following windows correspond to the numerical questions. A brief text
then explains the background to the verbal questions, which consists of a set
of pre-defined multiple choice answers and a box for the user to complete.
Finally, there are two sets of questions about the respondent’s background
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and characteristics, followed by a page thanking the respondent for his/her
participation in the experiment.
The Appendix contains images of the screens presented to the respon-
dents, with the whole text of the setting and the questions. There is also a
“live” demonstration of the experiment accessible through the World Wide
Web.8
3.3 Beyond paper based questionnaires: the Virtual
Laboratory approach
Most of the empirical work described in Section 3.1 used paper questionnaires
and worked with student samples (see for instance Amiel 1999; Amiel and
Cowell 1999). The general form of these experiments has been as follows:
• Respondents are asked numerical and/or verbal questions about alter-
native distributions in carefully specified hypothetical environments.
• Internal controls for consistency of responses are incorporated in the
question design.
For this study, we developed an extension of the original methodology that
supersedes the paper based “questionnaire experiments”. At the core of the
research is a new Internet-based technology, the Virtual Laboratory, a facility
for designing and running questionnaire experiments. The motivation of the
Virtual Laboratory is three-fold: (a) individual respondents can participate
remotely; (b) interaction with the Web-server is designed in a way that allows
observation of the process of reaching decisions as well as final judgments;
(c) researchers at remote locations can develop and redesign experiments and
download results automatically.
It still has to be established whether the format of the questionnaire
(paper or electronic) has any eﬀect on the nature of the results. Whereas the
present experiment was only administered electronically, ongoing research is
seeking to establish if there is any kind of bias using the R4A4 experiment
(see for instance Amiel 1999; Amiel and Cowell 1999) for which both paper
based and electronic questionnaires are available.9
8It can be accessed by following the link:
http://darp.lse.ac.uk/test/0302b/start.asp
Note that since this is the same version administered to our respondents, the resulting
questionnaire will be one of the four versions described above, chosen at random by the
web server. To see each of the four diﬀerent versions, please use the following link:
http://darp.lse.ac.uk/types.htm
9An example of the original experiment from Amiel and Cowell (2001), can be found
at http://darp.lse.ac.uk/experimentdemo.htm
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We now turn the nature of our sample and present our results.
4 Data and Results
4.1 Characteristics of the respondents
4.1.1 Selection of the sample
The questionnaire experiment was administered to a sample of ninety-two
LSE students during the academic years 2001/2002 and 2002/2003. The stu-
dents were mostly undergraduates from Economics and other social sciences.
Considering the choice of the respondent sample and the mechanisms to
induce participation, there are two main issues in experimental economics:
the source of participants, and the incentives to participate.
Regarding the participants, whereas we make intensive use of Internet
technology, we did not want to have a respondent base drawn from the
random flow of Internet users. For that reason, we limited our sample by
contacting our own students by email, briefly explaining in general terms the
purpose of the research and giving them a URL to follow. This ensured a
relatively high quality of responses, which in our view is far more important
than a potentially large sample size with low quality responses. The issue of
whether students are representative of the population and the need to extend
the respondent base beyond universities is left for further research.
On the other hand, incentives (and, especially, remuneration linked to
experimental outcomes) are seen as highly important in market-based exper-
iments to ensure that participants will put in eﬀort and behave rationally. In
our setting, however, there are no correct answers, and this type of incentive
is not necessary. However, we set up a random draw of 25 GBP as a way to
motivate the student’s participation in the experiment. While it might be
argued that this lottery would attract students with biased preferences over
risky prospects, the results outlined below are roughly consistent with pre-
vious findings obtained in non remunerated experiments and questionnaires.
4.1.2 The respondent sample
Table 1 contains summary statistics of the respondents’ characteristics col-
lected at the end of the questionnaire. As can be expected from a group
consisting mainly of undergraduate students, the average age is only 20.2
years, with 82% of respondents between 18 and 21 years old. The sample
contains a majority of males (58%), which reflects the composition of the
courses in which the experiments were administered. A relatively high 41%
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Table 1: Characteristics of respondents
Characteristics PV PV
Variable Obs Mean σ Min Max Risk Fr.
Age 87 20.24 2.12 18 31 0.329 0.372
Females 92 42% 0.5 0 1 0.736 0.422
Employed 92 41% 0.5 0 1 0.571 0.806
Family inc. (1-7) 85 4.5 1.12 2 7 0.913 0.971
Inc. prospect (1-7) 84 5.2 0.92 2 7 0.173 0.780
Subject=Econ. 92 63% 0.49 0 1 0.837 0.874
Pol. Views (1-7) 85 4.1 0.95 2 6 0.433 0.515
Left 92 21% 0.41 0 1 0.867 0.719
Right 92 30% 0.46 0 1 0.447 0.317
of the students declared themselves to have been employed, though given
the nature of their degrees this probably refers mostly to part time jobs.
Regarding the subject of study, 63% of the respondents follow an economics
degree (or a mixed economics degree - i.e., “Economics and Finance”, etc.).
In terms of political views, respondents were asked to classify themselves in
a one to seven scale, where four represented the centre, lower values the left
and higher values the right. The mean of this variable, 4.1, suggests that the
sample is relatively balanced with respect to political views.
Finally, for a set of reasons (privacy, the international nature of the sam-
ple, avoiding missing answers from indiscreet questions), students were not
asked about their current incomes, but instead were required to classify their
family incomes in 1990 and their expected future income in 2010 in a one to
seven scale (one being poor and seven rich). We can see that our group of
respondents are relatively optimistic about the future, with a mean of past
family income of 4.5 and future income of 5.2.
These characteristics are the main controls that will be used in the analy-
sis of the results.
4.1.3 Types of questionnaires
As explained in Section 3.2, our experiment consists of four diﬀerent types
of questionnaires from the mix of friend/self and risk/preference categories.
In order to make inferences about the relevance of these categories for the
experiment’s answers, we must verify that there was no bias in the assignment
of the respondents.
Reassuringly, the evidence confirms that the sample is well balanced
among categories. The questionnaires were assigned randomly to the stu-
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Table 2: Types of questionnaires
Type of Questionnaire Respondents %
Preference-Self 25 27.17%
Preference-Friend 17 18.48%
Risk-Self 20 21.74%
Risk-Friend 30 32.61%
Total 92 100%
dents by a computer handled randomisation which worked correctly. While
we can observe in Table 2 that there are relatively more risk-friend and less
preference-friend questionnaires, this is mostly due to the small size of the
sample (simulations with the Virtual Laboratory show that increasing the
number of questionnaires would result in a convergence of 25% for each cate-
gory). Most importantly, Table 1 contains the p-values of t-tests of diﬀerences
in means in respondent characteristics between the risk and preference and
the friend and self questionnaires. As can be appreciated in the table, none
of the diﬀerences are even barely significant at the standard levels, confirming
that the allocation of questionnaires was truly random.
4.2 Results
4.2.1 Numerical questions
As explained above, in the numerical questions the respondents were asked
to choose between two vectors of possible outcomes. Table 3 presents the
results for the total number of questions answered (523) from the groups of 90
respondents with complete characteristics. It should be stressed that in the
risk questionnaire, the choice of option A (“Amore risky”) corresponds to the
agreement with the MPS principle, while in the preference questionnaire this
“orthodox” view is represented by the choice of option B (“B better”). This
is because in all numerical questions the vector represented by A is obtained
from B by a mean preserving spread (see Section 3.2). We will present the
answers in terms of options A, AB and B in this first table, but for the rest of
the document we will reclassify the answers and deal with categories defined
as agreement/indiﬀerence/disagreement with the MPS principle.
From this table we can extract some preliminary conclusions. While
agreement with the MPS principle is high, it seems to be higher for the risk
questionnaire (61.3 versus 55.9% of the answers). While the t-tests of this
diﬀerence (not reported) are not significant at the 5% level, the diﬀerences in
the indiﬀerence and rejection rates of the MPS are strongly significant (28.2%
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Table 3: Answers by type of questionnaire
Risk
Answers Friend % Self % Total %
A 106 63.1% 70 58.8% 176 61.3%
AB 44 26.2% 37 31.1% 81 28.2%
B 18 10.7% 12 10.1% 30 10.5%
Total 168 100% 119 100% 287 100%
Preference
Answers Friend % Self % Total %
A 32 31.7% 24 17.8% 56 23.7%
AB 19 18.8% 29 21.5% 48 20.3%
B 50 49.5% 82 60.7% 132 55.9%
Total 101 100% 135 100% 236 100%
vs. 20.3%, and 10.5% vs. 23.7% , for risk and preference respectively).
However, the small diﬀerences in answers between the self and friend versions
do not appear to be significant at standard levels. We will return to this point
when dealing with the multivariate analysis.
Full agreement with the principle requires a simple but strict pattern of
responses: “AAAAAA” in the case of risk, and “BBBBBB” in the case of
preference. The subsample adopting this “pure” form of response is sparse:
preference-self : 5 respondents, preference-friend : 1 respondent, risk-self : 3
respondents and risk-friend : 9 respondents.
Because of this sparseness, in the following tables we have re-classified the
answers in three categories as explained above (agreement / indiﬀerence to /
disagreement with theMPS). Rather than conducting the analysis at the level
of individual questions, we aggregated the answers by respondent, assigning
them to one category only if 50% or more of the answers corresponded with
one of these categories.
With this new definition, we can observe in Table 4 that around 68% of
the respondents agree with the MPS principle. However, a non-negligible
32% does not accept it (weakly and/or strongly), and in the case of strongly
rejecting it, it was much more important for questions asked in terms of
preference (21%) than risk (4%).
Table 5 presents information about the same reclassification, but this
time breaking down answers by self or friend questionnaires. It appears
that there is a much higher probability of a strong rejection of the MPS if
the questionnaire was of the friend type (17%) than the self (7%).
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Table 4: Answers by type of questionnaires - risk
Answer Preference Risk Total
Disagreement w/MPS 21% 4% 12%
Indiﬀerence 13% 26% 20%
Agreement w/MPS 66% 70% 68%
Total 100% 100% 100%
N 38 46 84
Table 5: Answers by type of questionnaire-self
Answer Self Friend Total
Disagreement w/MPS 7% 17% 12%
Indiﬀerence 23% 17% 20%
Agreement w/MPS 70% 66% 68%
Total 100% 100% 100%
N 43 41 84
Finally, Table 6 presents the same information but broken down by the
four types of questionnaires. Not surprisingly in the light of previous com-
ments, the “preference-friend” type has the highest strong rejection rate
(33%), while no “disagreement” with the MPS principle occurring in the
“risk-self” case. This is important because this case is perhaps the most
standard way of presenting the question. Of course, this is due to the reclas-
sification of the results that amalgamate the answers to six questions into one
category: in Table 3, we can observe that there were as many as 30 answers
(from a total of 523) rejecting the MPS principle in the risk-self category.
After these basic results, we present a multivariate regression analysis
that allows us to control not only for the type of questionnaire, but also for
individual characteristics of the respondents.
4.2.2 Multivariate analysis of numerical questions
The question immediately arises whether the type of question remains an
important determinant of heterodox responses once we control for personal
characteristics of the respondents. We are also interested in knowing if any
of these characteristics have a systematic eﬀect on answers. To address this
issue we use a standard probit regressions of the form:
Pr(Response Pattern) = Φ(b1y1 + b2y2 + ...+ bnyn) (3)
where yj is a measure of personal or background characteristic j, (b1, ..., bn)
is a vector of coeﬃcients and Φ is the normal distribution function. Given
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Table 6: Answers to numerical questions
Num. Questions Pref.-Self Pref.-Fr. Risk-Self Risk-Fr. Total
Disagr. w/MPS 13% 33% - 8% 12%
Indiﬀerence 17% 7% 30% 23% 20%
Agreement w/MPS 70% 60% 70% 69% 68%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
N 23 15 20 26 84
that there were m separate numerical questions (where m = 6 in our case)
there are two main interpretations of “Response Pattern” in (3) of particular
interest to us:
1. We first look at a single response pattern which we defined as a majority
of answers in agreement / indiﬀerence to / disagreement with the MPS
principle, in which case we have N observations.
2. We then turn to the analysis of the m separate responses (each of
which could be agreement / indiﬀerence to / disagreement with the
MPS). This gives usmN observations; however, since we have repeated
observations for each respondent, we will cluster the observations by
respondent. Not doing so would introduce a spurious downward bias
in the coeﬃcient’s standard errors.
Table 7 and Table 8 display the results of these two interpretations, re-
porting the marginal eﬀects at the mean of the dependent variable.10 The
three dependent variables are coded as one for agreement / indiﬀerence /
disagreement with the MPS; as explained above, in Table 7 we refer to a ma-
jority of answers of a certain type, while in Table 8 we consider every answer
individually. The dependent variables are age, political opinion coded as left
and right (smaller or greater than 4, the centre value), and dummies for gen-
der (1 for male), work status and economic subject.11 Moreover, we control
10The “marginal eﬀect” in these tables and elsewhere is interpreted as follows. Let P
denote the relevant probability on the left-hand side of (3). Then, given the probit model,
it is clear that for the ith explanatory variable, the marginal impact of an increase in yi
on the probability is proportional to the coeﬃcient bi thus:
dP
dyi
= bi ϕ

X
j
bjyj


where ϕ (·) is the normal density function.
11The variables income rank in 1990 and income rank in 2010 were not included in
the regressions because they were not significant in any of the specifications, and caused
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whether the respondent answered a risk or preference questionnaire (with
the indicator risk being one), and self or friend (with one corresponding to
the self case).
Table 7 contains interesting results regarding both individual character-
istics and type of questionnaire. Firstly, none of the variables seem to have
any eﬀect on the probabilities of agreeing or being indiﬀerent to the MPS.
However, there are strongly significant determinants of the disagreement indi-
cator. Regarding personal characteristics, it is interesting to note the lack of
any gender eﬀect or any eﬀect from pursuing an economics degree, which had
been identified as important factors in previous research. Being older has a
negative and significant eﬀect on the probability of disagreeing with standard
economic theory, which may be proxying for the small subset of postgraduate
students in our sample who have been more exposed to the standard axioms
of economic theory. Finally, being employed or at the left of the political
spectrum significantly increases the probability of the respondent having a
point of view not consistent with standard economic assumptions.
Regarding the type of questionnaires, the Risk type clearly reduces the
probability of disagreement with the MPS; the Self type also reduces this
probability, but the level of significance of this coeﬃcient is much lower.
The results in Table 8 correspond to the case in which we consider the
answer to all questions. This allows us to increase significantly the number
of observations and thus precision (although as stated above we control for
repeated observations by clustering on individual respondents — observations
from the same person are not considered independent in the regression), and
avoids the biases that might be introduced by the aggregation procedure
we used for the previous table, which is arbitrary up to a certain point.
This regression also includes controls for each of the six numerical questions,
since they imply diﬀerent mean preserving spreads and thus we can expect
respondents to evaluate them diﬀerently.
We notice again that none of the variables on questionnaire type or indi-
vidual characteristics seem to have any eﬀect on the probabilities of agreeing
or being indiﬀerent to the MPS (except for a barely significant eﬀect from
“right” in the indiﬀerent case). But again, we find strong predictors of the
“heterodox” position. There is now a slightly significant eﬀect of gender,
with males having a higher probability of answering in a conventional way.
Being older again has a negative and significant eﬀect on the probability of
disagreeing with standard risk theory, while being employed has a positive
and significant eﬀect on heterodoxy. Finally, there is no eﬀect from pursuing
colinearity problems in some of the regressions. The results were not qualitatively altered
by this omission.
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Table 7: Probit Results, Numerical Questions — Aggregated Responses
Disag. w/MPS Indiﬀerent Agrees w/MPS
Male -0.0428 [1.24] 0.0428 [0.47] 0.0069 [0.06]
age -0.0267 [1.93]* 0.0071 [0.32] 0.0246 [0.82]
Risk -0.1241 [3.64]*** 0.1433 [1.62] 0.0405 [0.37]
Self -0.0608 [1.79]* 0.1034 [1.25] 0.032 [0.30]
employed 0.1028 [2.59]*** -0.0117 [0.12] -0.168 [1.42]
left 0.1604 [2.05]** -0.1539 [1.49] 0.0617 [0.45]
right 0.0117 [0.31] -0.0741 [0.76] 0.1291 [1.08]
econ 0.0284 [1.07] -0.0293 [0.30] -0.0364 [0.33]
Pseudo R2 0.316 0.077 0.035
Notes:
N=83
Level of significance: *10%, **5%, ***1%
Robust z statistic in brackets,
Except for age, dF
dx
is for discrete change of dummy from 0 to 1
Table 8: Probit Results, Numerical Questions — All Responses
Heterodox Indiﬀerent Orthodox
Male -0.0656 [1.65]* -0.0003 [0.00] 0.0838 [1.09]
age -0.0283 [2.25]** -0.0165 [0.79] 0.04 [1.48]
Risk -0.1445 [3.80]*** 0.0938 [1.58] 0.072 [0.98]
Self -0.0598 [1.63] 0.0472 [0.81] 0.0333 [0.45]
employed 0.07 [1.77]* 0.0152 [0.22] -0.0993 [1.14]
left -0.0158 [0.30] -0.0337 [0.45] 0.0514 [0.52]
right 0.0065 [0.17] -0.1341 [1.88]* 0.1318 [1.54]
econ 0.0402 [1.13] -0.0049 [0.07] -0.0455 [0.58]
Question 2 -0.0836 [2.15]** 0.383 [6.09]*** -0.2585 [4.32]***
Question 3 -0.0278 [0.84] 0.0807 [1.94]* -0.0284 [0.56]
Question 4 0.0194 [0.46] -0.0795 [1.26] 0.0375 [0.63]
Question 5 -0.1187 [2.67]*** -0.0094 [0.15] 0.1864 [2.53]**
Question 6 -0.0398 [1.02] 0.1877 [3.59]*** -0.1112 [1.94]*
Pseudo R2 0.145 0.124 0.09
Notes:
N=517
Level of significance: *10%, **5%, ***1%
Robust z statistic in brackets, clustered by respondent
Except for age, dF
dx
is for discrete change of dummy from 0 to 1
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an economics degree or from political views.
As in the previous regressions, the Risk case clearly reduces the probabil-
ity of non standard answers, while the small eﬀect of the Self questionnaire
we noticed in the previous table now disappears.
We now turn to the analysis of the verbal question.
4.3 The verbal question
4.3.1 Descriptive analysis
The question itself is very similar to the ones used in previous studies on
perceptions of inequality. Respondents face a set of statements, and they have
to choose which correspond to their views - multiple selections are allowed.
There are five possible responses, including “none of the above”. The choice
of these responses was designed to cover the views corresponding to the MPS
principle. Individuals are allowed to check more than one response, and only
response “d” is consistent with the standard risk theory view.
Table 9: Answers to verbal question
Answer Freq. Percent
a 10 11.49
ac 3 3.45
ad 1 1.15
ab 2 2.3
b 25 28.74
bc 2 2.3
c 14 16.09
cd 2 2.3
d 16 18.39
e 12 13.79
Total 87 100
The fact that respondents were allowed to make multiple selections from
question 7 means that we can interpret consistency with economic orthodoxy
in either a broad or narrow sense. On the narrow interpretation — whether
for preference or for risk questionnaires — people should have checked “d” and
nothing else. However, it might be reasonable to look at cases where, because
of diﬃculties with understanding the question, or some perceived ambiguity,
respondents checked both “d” and one or more other possibilities.
We can see in Table 9 that 19% chose the orthodox answer, and less
than 22% chose this option or this option combined with some other. These
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Table 10: Probit Results — Verbal Question
Heterodox
Male 0.1694 [0.0986]*
age -0.0484 [0.0234]**
Risk -0.0235 [0.0795]
Self 0.0086 [0.0847]
employed 0.2014 [0.0828]**
left 0.0155 [0.1083]
right -0.1511 [0.1158]
econ 0.0307 [0.0966]
Pseudo R2 0.105
Notes:
N=87
Level of significance as in previous tables
Robust z statistic in brackets
Except for age, marginal eﬀects for dummies
numbers were higher in the case of Risk and Friend questionnaires (not
reported). Support for the pure MPS seems to be very low when spelled out
directly.
We now turn to a brief regression analysis of the determinants of answers
to the verbal question.
4.3.2 Regression analysis
Let us look once again at the role of personal factors on the response to the
verbal question using probit regressions. Table 10 presents the results of a
probit estimation of a model like (3), using the same independent variables
as in the two previous regression tables. The dependent variable, in this case,
is an indicator that takes value one if the respondent did not choose option
“d” or option “d” combined with some other choice in the verbal question.
Employment and age continue to be significant, with the same signs as
before. The indicator for male respondents is again significant, but in this
case with a positive (though not highly significant) coeﬃcient: in the ver-
bal question, being male increases the chance of a non-orthodox response.
Finally, political opinion and economics subject are not significant.
Regarding the type of questionnaire, this table indicates that there does
not seem to be any type of questionnaire eﬀect on answers to the verbal
question.
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4.4 Comparison with previous results
While Amiel and Cowell (2002) find persistent evidence of an “orthodox” ef-
fect from studying an economic subject in inequality comparisons, in the case
of risk we do not find any significant eﬀect from this individual characteristic.
This may be an artefact of the sample selection in this case: the LSE stu-
dents approached were either economics specialists or pursuing courses that
have a high economics component.
They also found that being male had similar impact — more conventional
numerical responses; in our case, we find the same for the numerical ques-
tions, although for verbal questions this result is reversed (males appear to
be more heterodox than females).
5 Conclusions
By means of our questionnaire experiments, we find evidence that a minority
of respondents do not respect the principle of mean-preserving spreads in
their risk-rankings. Moreover, we find some evidence that rankings by risk
are not simply the reverse of ranking by preference over distributions with
a given mean. Comparisons in terms of preference seem to induce a higher
proportion of disagreement with the MPS for similar underlying questions.
However, we find significant evidence that risk-rankings are independent
of whether the individual is personally involved in the gains/losses associated
with the uncertain prospects, at least as far as our experimental setting
is concerned. Finally, we also find that there is almost no eﬀect in the
response pattern from the “gender” of the respondent, or the fact that he/she
is studying economics.
The results we obtained are broadly consistent with previous work done
with paper questionnaires on risk and inequality. Future work will focus on
significantly increasing the sample to test the robustness of our findings.
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Appendix 1 – Sample Questionnaire 
 
This appendix contains a sample questionnaire. Following is the sequence of screens 
seen by a respondent who completed the risk-friend type of questionnaire. We prefer to 
use these images rather than the text to give the reader an idea of the whole “look and 
feel” of the questionnaire. A “live” version of the questionnaire is available on the World 
Wide Web and can be found at:  
http://darp.lse.ac.uk/test/0302b/start.asp  
 
The questionnaire below corresponds to the risk/self category. The other categories 
are defined as follow: 
 
· Friend/Self : the questionnaires ask about a prospective job offer to be considered 
by the respondent (self), or for advising a friend (friend). 
· Risk / Preference: in the numerical questions, the options are labeled “More 
risky” (risk) or “Better” (preference). 
 
Please note that the “live” version will randomise between the four types of 
questionnaire available. To see a particular version, please follow the URL: 
http://darp.lse.ac.uk/types.htm  
 
Apart from these different categories, all the questionnaires are exactly the same. 
After logging, the respondent is presented with a general preamble about the 
questionnaire, followed by an explanation about the numerical questions. The six 
following windows correspond to the numerical questions. A brief text explains the 
background to the verbal questions, which consists in a set of pre-defined multiple choice 
answers and  a box for the user to complete. Finally, there are two sets of questions about 
the respondent’s background and characteristics, following by a page thanking the 
respondent for participating in the experiment. 
 






 
